ci(hooks): pre-commit security check (mirror of fai/platform)
Mirrors the hook + script from `fai/platform`@1ebf893 verbatim so commits to fai_studio go through the same gate: secrets, forbidden filenames, confidentiality references, marketing- speak, DCO sign-off, Conventional Commits subject, no Claude co-author trailer. A `.security-allow` file at the repo root extends the script's universal excludes with three Studio-specific paths whose content legitimately includes the filtered terms — the Today-Hero proposal pipeline (LLM prompt + accept gate), its runtime loader equivalent, and its operator-facing policy doc. No CI mirror yet — Studio doesn't have a Forgejo workflow (Flutter-on-DinD is a chunk of work). The local hook is the gate for now; CI mirror follows when Flutter CI lands. Activate once with `bash tools/install-hooks.sh`. Signed-off-by: flemming-it <stefan.a.flemming@googlemail.com>
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18
tools/install-hooks.sh
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18
tools/install-hooks.sh
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# F∆I Platform — one-time hook activation for this clone.
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# Points git at the versioned `.githooks/` directory so pre-commit and
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# commit-msg checks run on every commit (including amends and rebases).
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#
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# Run once after cloning:
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# bash tools/install-hooks.sh
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set -euo pipefail
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cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
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git config core.hooksPath .githooks
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chmod +x .githooks/* tools/security/*.sh tools/install-hooks.sh
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echo "✓ core.hooksPath = .githooks"
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echo " Active hooks:"
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ls -1 .githooks/ | sed 's/^/ /'
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echo ""
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echo "Next commit will be gated by tools/security/check-staged.sh."
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246
tools/security/check-staged.sh
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tools/security/check-staged.sh
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# F∆I Platform — staged-content security check.
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# Runs from .githooks/pre-commit, .githooks/commit-msg, and Forgejo CI.
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#
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# Modes:
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# content — scan staged files (filename + diff) for secrets,
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# confidential terms, banned phrases, forbidden files
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# message FILE — scan a commit-message file for DCO sign-off,
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# Conventional Commit subject, no Claude trailer
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# ci [BASE] — scan all changes between BASE..HEAD
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# (default BASE: origin/main)
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#
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# Exits non-zero on any violation; prints all violations before exiting
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# so the operator sees the full picture in one pass.
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set -uo pipefail
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cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
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MODE="${1:-content}"
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FAILED=0
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if [ -t 1 ]; then
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RED=$'\033[31m'; YEL=$'\033[33m'; GRN=$'\033[32m'; RST=$'\033[0m'
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else
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RED=''; YEL=''; GRN=''; RST=''
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fi
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fail() { printf "%s✗ %s%s\n" "$RED" "$*" "$RST" >&2; FAILED=1; }
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pass() { printf "%s✓ %s%s\n" "$GRN" "$*" "$RST"; }
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# ─── Patterns ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Secrets — case-sensitive. Patterns are deliberately narrow to avoid
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# false-positives on plain SHA-1s (40 hex), commit refs, etc. Each entry
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# requires either a known prefix or a context keyword.
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SECRET_PATTERNS=(
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'ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}' # GitHub PAT
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'gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}' # GitHub OAuth
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'ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}' # GitHub server-to-server
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'sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}' # Anthropic API key
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'sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{48,}' # OpenAI API key
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'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}' # AWS access key id
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'(token|Bearer)[ =]"?[a-f0-9]{40}\b' # Forgejo / Gitea PAT in
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# header / URL / env
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'FORGEJO_TOKEN[= ]"?[a-f0-9]{40}' # Forgejo PAT in env-var
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'-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----' # Private keys (RSA, EC, …)
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)
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# Filenames that should never be committed.
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FORBIDDEN_FILE_PATTERNS=(
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'(^|/)\.env$'
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'(^|/)\.env\.local$'
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'(^|/)credentials\.(json|yaml|yml|toml)$'
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'\.(pem|p12|pfx|key)$'
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'(^|/)id_(rsa|ed25519|ecdsa|dsa)(\.pub)?$'
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)
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# Filenames matching FORBIDDEN_FILE_PATTERNS but explicitly allowed.
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FILE_ALLOWLIST=(
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'\.env\.example$'
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'\.env\.template$'
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'\.env\.sample$'
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'tests?/.*\.(pem|key)$' # Test fixtures
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'fixtures?/.*\.(pem|key)$'
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)
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# Memory: confidentiality.md — these are PRIVATE. Never in public
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# code / docs / commits / examples. Word-boundary matched to avoid
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# false-positives on substrings.
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CONFIDENTIAL_TERMS=(
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'\bITDZ\b'
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'\bKammergericht\b'
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'\bHTW\b'
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'J∆I'
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'\bJAI\b'
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)
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# Memory: feedback_no_marketing_speak.md.
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BANNED_PHRASES=(
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'\bviral\b'
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'\bkiller (feature|app)\b'
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'\bjust works\b'
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'\bpowerful\b'
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'\bgame[- ]changer\b'
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'\brevolutionary\b'
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'\bworld[- ]class\b'
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'\bblazingly fast\b'
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'\blightning[- ]fast\b'
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)
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# ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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scan_secrets() {
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# Case-sensitive — secret prefixes have known casing.
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local input="$1"
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for pat in "${SECRET_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
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local hits
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hits=$(printf "%s" "$input" | grep -E -- "$pat" 2>/dev/null || true)
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if [ -n "$hits" ]; then
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fail "secret pattern matched: $pat"
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printf "%s\n" "$hits" | head -3 | sed 's/^/ /' >&2
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fi
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done
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}
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scan_terms_ci() {
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# Case-insensitive — banned terms / confidentiality.
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local label="$1"; local input="$2"; shift 2
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for pat in "$@"; do
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local hits
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hits=$(printf "%s" "$input" | grep -i -E -- "$pat" 2>/dev/null || true)
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if [ -n "$hits" ]; then
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fail "$label: $pat"
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printf "%s\n" "$hits" | head -3 | sed 's/^/ /' >&2
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fi
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done
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}
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is_allowlisted_file() {
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local f="$1"
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for ap in "${FILE_ALLOWLIST[@]}"; do
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if printf "%s" "$f" | grep -E -- "$ap" >/dev/null; then
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return 0
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fi
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done
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return 1
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}
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scan_filenames() {
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local files="$1"
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[ -z "$files" ] && return
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while IFS= read -r f; do
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[ -z "$f" ] && continue
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is_allowlisted_file "$f" && continue
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for fp in "${FORBIDDEN_FILE_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
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if printf "%s" "$f" | grep -E -- "$fp" >/dev/null; then
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fail "forbidden file in stage: $f (matches $fp)"
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fi
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done
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done <<< "$files"
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}
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scan_diff() {
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local diff="$1"
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[ -z "$diff" ] && return
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scan_secrets "$diff"
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scan_terms_ci "confidential term" "$diff" "${CONFIDENTIAL_TERMS[@]}"
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scan_terms_ci "banned phrase" "$diff" "${BANNED_PHRASES[@]}"
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}
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# ─── Modes ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# The security script itself stores the patterns as regex strings, so its
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# own diff would self-flag on every commit. Exclude the security tooling
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# directories from the content scan. Repos with additional meta-files that
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# legitimately mention banned terms (a banned-words gate in code, a policy
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# doc, an LLM prompt template that filters such terms) extend this list
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# via a `.security-allow` file at the repo root: one pathspec per line,
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# blank lines and `#` comments ignored.
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EXCLUDES=(":(exclude)tools/security/" ":(exclude).githooks/")
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if [ -f ".security-allow" ]; then
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while IFS= read -r line; do
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line="${line%%#*}"
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line="${line#"${line%%[![:space:]]*}"}"
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line="${line%"${line##*[![:space:]]}"}"
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[ -z "$line" ] && continue
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EXCLUDES+=(":(exclude)$line")
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done < ".security-allow"
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fi
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scan_content_mode() {
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local files diff
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files=$(git diff --cached --name-only --diff-filter=ACMR)
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diff=$(git diff --cached --no-color -U0 -- . "${EXCLUDES[@]}" \
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| grep -E '^\+[^+]' || true)
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scan_filenames "$files"
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scan_diff "$diff"
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}
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scan_message_mode() {
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local msgfile="${1:-}"
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if [ -z "$msgfile" ] || [ ! -f "$msgfile" ]; then
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fail "commit-message file not found: $msgfile"
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return
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fi
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# Strip git's commentary lines.
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local msg subject
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msg=$(grep -v '^#' "$msgfile")
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subject=$(printf "%s" "$msg" | head -1)
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# Skip merge / fixup / squash / revert — git generates these and the
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# subject can't always be reshaped to Conventional Commits.
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case "$subject" in
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"Merge "*|"fixup! "*|"squash! "*|"Revert "*) return ;;
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esac
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if ! printf "%s" "$subject" \
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| grep -E '^(feat|fix|docs|refactor|test|chore|perf|build|ci|style)(\([a-z0-9_,-]+\))?!?: .+' \
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>/dev/null; then
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fail "subject is not Conventional Commits: $subject"
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fail " expected: type(scope): message (type: feat|fix|docs|refactor|test|chore|perf|build|ci|style)"
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fi
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if ! printf "%s" "$msg" | grep -E '^Signed-off-by: .+ <.+@.+>$' >/dev/null; then
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fail "missing DCO sign-off line (use git commit -s)"
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fi
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if printf "%s" "$msg" | grep -i 'co-authored-by:.*claude' >/dev/null; then
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fail "Co-Authored-By: Claude trailer is forbidden (memory: feedback_coding_style.md)"
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fi
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scan_terms_ci "confidential term in commit message" "$msg" "${CONFIDENTIAL_TERMS[@]}"
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scan_terms_ci "banned phrase in commit message" "$msg" "${BANNED_PHRASES[@]}"
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}
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scan_ci_mode() {
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local base="${1:-origin/main}"
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if ! git rev-parse --quiet --verify "$base" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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base=$(git rev-list --max-parents=0 HEAD | tail -1)
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fi
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local files diff
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files=$(git diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACMR "$base"..HEAD)
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diff=$(git diff --no-color -U0 "$base"..HEAD -- . "${EXCLUDES[@]}" \
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| grep -E '^\+[^+]' || true)
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scan_filenames "$files"
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scan_diff "$diff"
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}
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case "$MODE" in
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content) scan_content_mode ;;
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message) scan_message_mode "${2:-}" ;;
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ci) scan_ci_mode "${2:-}" ;;
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*)
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echo "usage: $0 {content | message FILE | ci [BASE_REF]}" >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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if [ "$FAILED" -ne 0 ]; then
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printf "\n%sSecurity check failed.%s\n" "$RED" "$RST" >&2
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printf "Edit the staged files / commit message and re-stage.\n" >&2
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printf "%sIf a match is a verified false positive, --no-verify bypasses the hook.\n" "$YEL" >&2
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printf "Never bypass for real secrets — rotate them first.%s\n" "$RST" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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pass "Security check passed."
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